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BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL: A DEATH 
KNELL FOR NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS?  
Annie McClellan* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Class action lawsuits trace back to thirteenth century England, which 
permitted “group litigation” for the efficiency of hearing cases during a 
time when travel was difficult.1 Although the concept died in England, 
the notion of congregating claims was introduced to American courts in 
the 1800s and has since become a tenet of modern-day litigation.2 
Eventually this group litigation rule was codified as Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 in 1938.3 The rule has undergone numerous changes over 
the years.4 The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, et al., a case that 
does not actually directly discuss class actions, arguably has had the most 
recent significant impact on the success of certifying classes.  
This Comment addresses whether Bristol-Myers Squibb in effect 
forbids the use of nationwide class actions.5 Section II provides a 
background of personal jurisdiction, class actions, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
and several district court decisions that Bristol-Myers Squibb has recently 
influenced. Section III closely examines the language of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and predicts how that language will likely affect lower court 
rulings in subsequent years. Section III also analyzes the impact of 
Bristol-Myers Squibb on district court personal jurisdiction class action 
decisions by reexamining the district court decisions outlined in Section 
II. Finally, Section III argues that specifically Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) class actions are the type of class action to be most 
affected by this latest Supreme Court ruling.  
 
*Associate Member, 2017-2018 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Michael E. Solimine, 
University of Cincinnati Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, for your guidance with this submission. 
Thank you to my family, friends, and editors for your support.  
 1. “History of Class Action Lawsuits,” CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS CENTER (2018), 
https://classactionlawsuitcenter.com/history-of-class-action-lawsuits/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Nationwide class actions are those in which all or some members in the plaintiff class are not 
from or injured in the forum state.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
Class actions are closely tied to personal jurisdiction issues because 
such lawsuits frequently involve plaintiffs living in and injured in 
numerous states throughout the country. Part (a) discusses personal 
jurisdiction and the two types of personal jurisdiction the Supreme Court 
recognizes. Part (b) notes the present state of federal law regarding class 
actions. Part (c) addresses the Supreme Court’s recent personal 
jurisdiction decision from the 2016-2017 term—Bristol-Myers Squibb—
released in June of 2017, and Part (d) examines some of the subsequent 
federal district courts’ decisions on personal jurisdiction affecting class 
actions since the Supreme Court’s June decision.6  
a. Personal Jurisdiction  
A court has authority to adjudicate an individual’s rights when it has 
personal, or territorial, jurisdiction over the people or property in the 
action.7 Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “no state shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”8 
“Property” in this clause can refer to a legal claim or cause of action,9 and 
this protection applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.10 While a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally favored, if the plaintiff chooses a 
forum outside of its home, less deference is given.11  
State legislatures determine the amount of authority state courts have 
over nonresident defendants.12 All states now have long-arm statutes to 
provide their state courts with personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants who cannot be served in the forum state.13 There are two types 
of long arm statutes.14 One is a laundry list approach that specifies factual 
 
 6. These cases were chosen based on how directly the courts discuss Bristol-Myers Squibb in 
advocating for their stances. At the time this Article was written, several months after the Supreme Court’s 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s ruling, there were a limited quantity of cases to choose from at the district court 
level and none had any appellate decisions yet.  
 7. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 99 (4th ed. 2005). 
 8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  
 9. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent 
Domain, 36:3 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 373, 373 (2009).  
 10. See, e.g., The Law Office of Stephen O’Rear, P.C., Assignment of Causes of Action in Texas, 
FORT WORTH INJURY LAWYER BLOG (June 25, 2013), https://www.fortworthinjurylawyer-
blog.com/2013/06/assignment-of-causes-of-action-in-texas.html (referring to a defendant’s ability to 
assign a cause of action against an insurance company to the plaintiff).  
 11. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 265-66 (1981).  
 12. RICHARD L. MARCUS, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 737 (7th ed. 2018).  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
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circumstances where due process requirements would likely be 
satisfied.15 Such statutes then require a separate analysis to ensure 
whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the 
Constitution.16 The other type of long arm statute employs a blanket 
approach, which permits all jurisdiction permitted by state and federal 
constitutional law.17 
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and 
specific, which are described respectively.18  
i. General Jurisdiction  
General jurisdiction is, in essence, “all-purpose” jurisdiction.19 General 
jurisdiction is established if an “individual’s domicile” is within the given 
forum.20 For corporations, general jurisdiction is established by an 
“equivalent place” to an individual’s domicile—“one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”21 When general jurisdiction 
exists, a court can hear a greater variety of claims by a plaintiff, even if 
the events giving rise to the claim occurred in a different state.22 
Continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state may be sufficient 
to establish general jurisdiction, especially where the defendant 
purposefully availed itself of the forum state’s laws.23 After the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown 
and Daimler AG v. Bauman, in 2011 and 2014 respectively, the place of 
incorporation and the principal place of business are the main components 
utilized by courts to establish general jurisdiction over corporations 
today.24 
If the easier general jurisdiction is not found, courts transition to a more 
fact-intensive specific jurisdiction analysis.25 
 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
 19. Id. at 758.  
 20. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 919. 
 23. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985).  
 24. 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011); 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
 25. Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 1251, 1271 
(2018).  
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ii. Specific Jurisdiction  
Specific jurisdiction is, in essence, “case-linked” jurisdiction.26 
Specific jurisdiction requires a lawsuit to “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”27 There must be an “affiliatio[n] 
between the forum and the underlying controversy”; some sort of relevant 
situation must occur in that state.28 The defendant, if not present in the 
state, must have minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.29 Moreover, the defendant must have purposefully 
availed itself to the privileges of conducting activities within the forum 
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the state’s law such 
that it is foreseeable the defendant would be haled into court there.30 
The requirement of minimum contacts was established in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington.31 There, orders for shoes were processed and 
shipped from out of state.32 However, the “contacts” to the state in this 
case were $31,000 in commissions, a dozen salesmen, shoe displays, 
rented sample rooms, rented exhibit buildings, and rented hotel rooms.33 
These contacts were enough to avoid violations of traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice when the state exercised personal 
jurisdiction over the company.34  
A series of decisions have addressed the concept of minimum contacts. 
For example, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. articulated the least 
possible contacts necessary to still find specific jurisdiction.35 In McGee, 
there was a mere life insurance policy connecting the defendant to that 
state, and that was deemed enough for the exercise of jurisdiction to 
comport with “fair play and substantial justice.”36 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson clarified the five factors 
identifying whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
are violated by a court exercising personal jurisdiction over a party.37 The 
factors are (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interest 
 
 26. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 
 27. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n. 8 (1984). 
 28. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 
 29. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); McGee v. International Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). 
 30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 31. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
 32. Id. at 314.  
 33. Id. at 313-14. 
 34. Id. at 316, 321.  
 35. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).  
 36. Id. at 221-23. 
 37. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).  
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in adjudicating the dispute, enforcing laws, or providing redress for its 
citizens, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution, and (5) the furtherance of fundamental substantive 
social policies.38 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiff suffered a car 
accident in Oklahoma, but the car was purchased in New York by New 
York residents.39 The Supreme Court found that there was no specific 
personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma just because the car accident happened 
to occur while the plaintiffs were passing through the state.40 The Court 
coined the accident as an “isolated occurrence” that did not rise to a level 
of establishing specific jurisdiction.41 
The due process analysis for personal jurisdiction requires more than 
minimum contacts and the fulfillment of traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.42 The quality and nature of the minimum contacts 
must be such that the defendant, through those contacts, “purposefully 
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”43  
Justice Brennan ordered the analysis in Burger King in 1985 when he 
used a two-step inquiry.44 First, the defendant must have “purposefully 
established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.”45 If sufficient 
contacts are present, then jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable.46 
However, the presumption may be overcome in the second inquiry if it 
can be shown that jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions 
of “fair play and substantial justice,” as set out in World-Wide 
Volkswagen.47  
This was the state of the law of specific personal jurisdiction prior to 
the Supreme Court’s Bristol-Myers Squibb decision in June of 2017. 
Some argue that specific personal jurisdiction law has not changed in light 
of Bristol-Myers Squibb.48 However, this Comment argues otherwise, 
especially for specific personal jurisdiction in class actions.  
 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 295.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 43. Id. at 253.  
 44. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
 45. Id.  
 46. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 7, at 154.  
 47. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.  
 48. See, e.g., Casso’s Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C. v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., Inc., No. 17-2161, 
2018 WL 1377608 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018).  
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b. Class Actions  
A court must have personal jurisdiction over all plaintiffs and all 
defendants in a lawsuit.49 Thus, even before Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
personal jurisdiction was a tenuous issue with larger class actions, 
because there were many players involved.50 Class actions, representative 
lawsuits in which several individuals sue on behalf of many class 
members similarly situated,51 are governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.52 In order to certify a class action, all four prongs of Rule 
23(a) must be satisfied, and one of the three prongs of 23(b) must be 
satisfied.53  
The prerequisites of 23(a) are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) 
typicality, and (4) adequacy.54 Numerosity means that there are so many 
class members that mere joinder of parties is impracticable.55 The 
presence of common issues of law or fact means that class members have 
suffered the same injury, such that there is a common contention 
“answerable in one fell swoop.”56 Typicality means that the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class.57 Finally, representative parties must fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of a class when there is a shared interest between the 
representatives and other class members and there is an unlikelihood of 
collusion among class representatives.58  
Rule 23(b) establishes several types of class actions.59 Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) class actions result when separate actions by individual 
parties would create a risk of inconsistent decisions, which would 
establish irreconcilable standards of conduct for the opposing party.60 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are found when plaintiffs’ individual 
abilities to win would be impeded or impaired if the lawsuits were all 
 
 49. Personal Jurisdiction, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (2018), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (referring to the 
exercise of power over a “party” in the case, not just the plaintiff or just the defendant).  
 50. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. 
La. 2012), aff’d 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).  
 51. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 308-11.  
 52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  
 53. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 317-29.  
 54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4).  
 55. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 328-29. 
 56. Jeffrey E. Crane, A New Battleground in Class Actions: The Commonality Requirement of 
23(a)(2), INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE LAW REPORT 30, 31 (2012), 
https://www2.sidley.com/files/upload/2012_IRLR_NEW_BATTLEGROUND.pdf.  
 57. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 7, at 762.  
 58. MARCUS, supra note 12, at 324-25. 
 59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).  
 60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/7
2019] BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB AND NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS 835 
separate.61 Rule 23(b)(2) class actions exist when the opposing party’s 
actions or lack of actions generally apply to the whole class, thus making 
injunctive or declaratory relief the most appropriate form of relief.62 
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes the class action device when the court 
finds that the “questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”63 
Rule 23 exemplifies the due process requirements of class actions.64 A 
court must look past the pleadings for the certification decision.65 A court 
must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable 
substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the 
certification issues.66 That courts should not consider the merits on class 
certification has long been a tenet in class action procedure.67 And 
although the recent Supreme Court decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb, did 
not deal explicitly with a class action on the facts, this personal 
jurisdiction case will surely have profound implications on class actions 
and will likely be a new “staple of first-year Civil Procedure courses 
everywhere.”68 
c. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San 
Francisco County, et al.  
Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) is a pharmaceutical company that 
manufactures and sells Plavix, a prescription drug that thins blood and 
prevents clotting.69 BMS developed, manufactured, labelled, and 
packaged Plavix, created a market strategy for Plavix, and worked on the 
regulatory approval of Plavix in New Jersey and New York.70 Across the 
country in California, BMS had, at the time of the decision, five research 
facilities, employed several hundred employees, and took in over $900 
million in Plavix pill sales over a six-year timespan.71 However, BMS 
 
 61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).  
 62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  
 63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
 64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring “notice” throughout).  
 65. See, e.g., AmChem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997) (analysis of whether class 
certification was correct included a look at fairness proceedings, settlement discussions, and final 
settlement).  
 66. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).  
 67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).  
 68. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1253.  
 69. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1777-78 (2017).  
 70. Id. at 1778.  
 71. Id. 
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maintained substantial operations in New York and New Jersey, with over 
half of its employees working in these two states.72 The corporation is 
headquartered in New York and incorporated in Delaware.73 
Hundreds of plaintiffs sued BMS in California state court for injuries 
allegedly caused by Plavix.74 Almost 600 plaintiffs resided in states 
outside of California, and less than 100 plaintiffs resided in California.75 
The claims were based exclusively on California state law, including 
products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading 
advertising laws.76 The plaintiffs did not allege that California physicians 
provided the drug, that injuries occurred in California, or that treatment 
occurred in California.77 The suit was not brought as a class action, 
despite hundreds of plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs wanted to avoid the 
removal of the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act.78  
BMS asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction regarding the 
nonresidents, but the California Superior Court denied the motion, finding 
general jurisdiction because of BMS’s “extensive activities in the State” 
of California.79 The State Court of Appeals eventually held that general 
jurisdiction was not present, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,80 because BMS is incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in New York.81 In other words, incorporation did not occur 
in and headquarters were not located in California. However, the Court of 
Appeals found that specific jurisdiction over the nonresident claims was 
present.82 The California Supreme Court agreed on the presence of 
specific jurisdiction, using a sliding scale approach,83 which 
acknowledged that the “more wide ranging the defendant’s forum 
contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum 
contacts and the claim.”84 Put differently, the sliding scale meant that 
“more extensive contacts with the forum state would offset a weak 
connection to nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.”85 The Supreme Court of the 
 
 72. Id. at 1777-78.  
 73. Id. at 1777.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 1778.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1255.  
 79. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1775. 
 80. 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) (holding that general jurisdiction over a corporation exists if the 
corporation’s connections are so continuous and systematic as to make the corporation basically at home 
in that forum state).  
 81. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1775. 
 82. Id. at 1778.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Brian A. Troyer, “District Courts Divide Over Application of ‘Bristol-Myers Squibb’ Decision 
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United States heard this case on the question of whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.86 
The Supreme Court was concerned with California’s sliding scale 
approach.87 The Court criticized the sliding scale approach as too relaxed. 
If the defendant had extensive forum contacts, but such contacts were 
unrelated to the claims, then the forum’s connection to the claims did not 
matter as much.88 The Court found that there was an insufficient 
connection between the forum of California and the claims for these 
hundreds of plaintiffs.89 There was not enough to find the necessary 
connection even though the other plaintiffs received and ingested Plavix 
in California, BMS conducted research in California, and BMS contracted 
with a California distributor.90 The court reasoned that since an “isolated 
occurrence” of an automobile accident in Oklahoma was not enough for 
the Court to find personal jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen, there 
was an even weaker connection to California in this case, as no injury 
occurred there.91 
The Supreme Court also distinguished the case from its Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. ruling from 1984.92 In Keeton, a New York 
plaintiff sued a New Hampshire defendant, which distributed its products 
throughout the country, including in New Hampshire.93 The Supreme 
Court noted that specific jurisdiction was present in Keeton because of the 
connection between the distribution of the product in New Hampshire and 
the alleged damage that occurred there.94 Alternatively, the plaintiffs in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb did not allege any harm in California, where BMS 
distributed its product.95 
Justice Sotomayor, in her Bristol-Myers Squibb dissent, voiced the 
concern that lower courts are expressing today. She emphasized that “the 
 
to Class Actions,” THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2018/02/05/district-
courts-divide-over-application-of-bristol-myers-squibb-decision-to-class-actions/ (emphasis added).  
 86. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1779. 
 87. Id. at 1781.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 1782; 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).  
 92. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782. 
 93. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772-74 (1984)).  
 94. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782 (noting further that Keeton regarded “the scope of a 
claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the State, not, as in [Bristol-Myers Squibb], 
jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State. 
Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the plaintiff’s 
claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by 
New Hampshire libel law.”) 
 95. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782. 
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majority’s rule will make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs 
across the country whose claims may be worth little alone.”96 She noted 
that bifurcation of claims and “piecemeal litigation” will occur because 
bringing state claim mass actions against defendants whose main forums 
are different states will be nearly impossible.97 Justice Sotomayor found 
that California courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over the 
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims because BMS purposefully availed itself of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the state and the plaintiffs’ claims related 
to BMS’s instate conduct.98 She noted that jurisdiction was reasonable 
because BMS was already facing identical claims from the approximately 
100 California plaintiffs.99 Separate suits in the other plaintiffs’ resident 
states would prove far more cumbersome for BMS.100 Justice Sotomayor 
saw the majority’s decision as handing corporate defendants one 
additional advantage,101 especially if plaintiffs try to bring a mass action 
against two or more defendants headquartered in different states.102 
Several lower district courts have already started confronting these 
adverse notions presented by the Bristol-Myers Squibb majority and 
Justice Sotomayor.  
d. Lower Court Decisions Since Bristol-Myers Squibb Ruling  
In the past few months since the Supreme Court’s 8-1 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb ruling, many district courts have wrestled with whether Bristol-
Myers Squibb affects their previous personal jurisdiction and class action 
analyses.103 Unfortunately for class plaintiffs, seemingly more courts than 
not are finding that Bristol-Myers Squibb does have an effect, despite 
Justice Alito’s contention in his majority opinion that the case makes no 
new law.104  
Three district court cases, from the Northern District of Illinois, the 
Northern District of California, and the Eastern District of Missouri, are 
addressed in the following sections to demonstrate that Justice Alito’s 
 
 96. Id. at 1784.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1786. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1789.  
 102. Id.  
 103. See, e.g., Everett v. Aurora Pump Co., No. 4:17CV230 HEA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4851 
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2018); Gonzalez-Camacho v. Banco Popular De P.R., No. 17-1448 (DRD), 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 55104 (D.P.R. Mar. 28, 2018); Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-
Kazyna JSC, Nos. 12-CV-8852 (JMF), 13-CV-5790 (JMF), 2018 WL 922191 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018); 
Erwin v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 229 (D. Del. 2018); Oliver v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-06950, 
2017 WL 3193652 (S.D.W. Va. July 27, 2017).  
 104. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1255-56.  
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precursory opinion does not reflect reality.  
i. Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. 
The Northern District of Illinois in Greene v. Mizuho Bank noted key 
implications of Bristol-Myers Squibb that affected the court’s outcome.105 
In Greene, a putative class action106 was filed by several users of bitcoin 
who lost funds when the defendant bank caused problems with 
withdrawals.107 In light of the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision, which came 
out while Greene was being litigated, the defendant bank argued that the 
court lacked jurisdiction over one of the class members because the 
complaint did not allege that the defendant had any contacts with Illinois 
in connection with that plaintiff’s claims.108 While the claims were very 
similar to the claims of other plaintiffs, who were residents of Illinois, the 
court determined that under Bristol-Myers Squibb, such similarity was not 
enough to establish jurisdiction over the defendant in connection with that 
plaintiff.109 
The plaintiffs in Greene additionally argued that the distinction 
between a putative class action in that case versus a mass action in Bristol-
Myers Squibb was significant.110 Mass actions and class actions treat 
plaintiffs differently.111 In a mass action, plaintiffs are treated as 
individuals, with facts needing to be established for each person.112 
Alternatively, in a class action, a class representative stands for the entire 
class and all of the members are treated as one plaintiff.113 The Northern 
District of Illinois, however, rejected this distinction, noting that Bristol-
Myers Squibb announced “a general principle—that due process requires 
a ‘connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue’”—when 
establishing jurisdiction.114 The court specifically noted that “nothing in 
Bristol-Myers [Squibb] suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs 
 
 105. 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 875-77 (N.D. Ill. 2017).  
 106. A putative class action is a class action that has not yet been certified by the court. Once a 
putative class is certified, it simply becomes a class action. Putative Class Action, INTERNATIONAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INC., https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/putative-class-action 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018).  
 107. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 872.   
 108. Id. at 874.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. What’s the Difference Between a Class Action and a Mass Tort (Mass Action)?, STARR 
AUSTEN & MILLER LLP (2018), http://www.starrausten.com/resources/what-is-the-difference-between-
a-class-action-and-a-mass-tort-mass-action/. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874.  
11
McClellan: Bristol-Myers Squibb and Nationwide Class Actions
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
840 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
in a putative class action,”115 even though Bristol-Myers Squibb only 
technically dealt with a mass action.116  
The plaintiffs further argued that pendent personal jurisdiction enabled 
specific jurisdiction over one plaintiff’s claims. Pendant personal 
jurisdiction consists of “jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a 
claim for which there is no independent basis of personal jurisdiction so 
long as it arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim 
in the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdiction.”117 
The Greene court struck down this argument too in light of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb.118 The court noted that Bristol-Myers Squibb now limits pendent 
personal jurisdiction, though without giving any justification.119 
Perhaps most remarkably, due to its rarity, the court in Greene excused 
an issue of forfeiture for the defendant in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb.120 
A party forfeits a theory, claim, or argument when it fails to argue it at an 
earlier opportunity.121 When a party does not make the argument, the 
opportunity to make the argument subsequently is not allowed, or 
“forfeited.”122 The Greene court noted that the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
decision in the middle of this litigation had a significant enough impact 
to necessitate such extreme lenity towards the defendant’s initial 
forfeitures of several arguments.123  
ii. In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation 
In In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, the Northern District 
of California granted one defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, although allowing leave to amend.124 The court held 
that the plaintiffs fell short of establishing general jurisdiction and 
specific jurisdiction, in light of Bristol-Myers Squibb.125 In In re Nexus 
6P, the plaintiffs alleged major defects in Google and Huawei Device 
USA (“Huawei”)’s Nexus 6P smartphones.126 They claimed that the 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 117. BRENT A. OLSEN, Personal Jurisdiction – Pendent Jurisdiction, 20A1 MINN. PRAC., BUSINESS 
LAW DESKBOOK, ADVANCED TOPICS IN BUSINESS LAW § 16B:140 (Nov. 2017 update). 
 118. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 875.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 876-77.  
 121. Id. at 876 (“[T]he forfeiture doctrine applies not only to a litigant’s failure to raise a general 
argument . . . but also to a litigant’s failure to advance a specific point in support of a general argument . 
. . .” (citing Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 386 (7th Cir. 2012))).  
 122. Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 876.  
 123. Id. at 877.   
 124. No. 17-cv-02185-BLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23622, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018).  
 125. Id. at *8, *16.  
 126. Id. at *3.  
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Northern District of California had general and specific jurisdiction over 
defendant Huawei, despite the defendant’s place of incorporation and 
principal place of business being in Texas.127 The plaintiffs argued this 
because the defendant “ha[d] conducted substantial business in [the 
Northern California] judicial district and intentionally and purposefully 
placed the [p]hones into the stream of commerce within this district and 
throughout the United States.”128 
The court denied finding general jurisdiction over Huawei because the 
plaintiffs did not show that research activities of Huawei went beyond a 
“‘substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ to contacts 
so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render Huawei ‘essentially at home’ 
in California.”129 Similarly, finding that specific jurisdiction was lacking, 
the court cited Bristol-Myers Squibb in noting that Huawei’s collaborative 
effort with California-based Google did not, by itself, confer specific 
jurisdiction.130 Plaintiffs also alleged that Huawei conducted research and 
had developmental facilities in California, but the court noted that these 
contacts were irrelevant under Bristol-Myers Squibb for purposes of 
specific jurisdiction if the research and development were unrelated to the 
Nexus 6P.131  
iii. Jordan v. Bayer Corp.  
The Eastern District of Missouri interpreted Bristol-Myers Squibb 
strictly in Jordan v. Bayer Corporation in February of 2018.132 The court 
dismissed a claim brought by non-Missouri plaintiffs for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, in light of the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling.133 The Jordan 
plaintiffs argued that the background section of the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
opinion provided litigants with a “blueprint” for asserting personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident claims.134 Specifically, the plaintiffs cited 
the portion of Bristol-Myers Squibb that notes that BMS “did not develop 
Plavix in California, did not create a marketing strategy for Plavix in 
California, and did not manufacture, label, package, or work on the 
regulatory approval of the product in California.”135 The plaintiffs in 
Jordan claimed that they satisfied this supposed “blueprint” by asserting 
 
 127. Id. at *4. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at *8 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761 (2014)).  
 130. In re Nexus 6P, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23622, at *12.  
 131. Id. at *13-14.  
 132. No. 4:17-cv-00865-AGF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23244, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2018).  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at *10.  
 135. Id.  
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that the defendant used Missouri as “ground zero” for its national 
campaign and that Missouri was the location for numerous clinical trials 
regarding the drug at issue in the case.136 
The Jordan court, however, did not find these assertions persuasive. It 
instead emphasized that Bristol-Myers Squibb requires narrower 
assertions for personal jurisdiction to be determined than the general 
presence of marketing strategies and clinical trials.137 That Missouri 
happened to be the first marketed area for the product throughout the 
United States was irrelevant to the court.138 The court took issue with the 
fact that the plaintiffs did not allege that they themselves actually saw the 
product being advertised in Missouri or that they themselves actually 
participated in the clinical trials happening in Missouri.139 That the non-
Missouri plaintiffs did not see marketing in Missouri, were not prescribed 
the product in Missouri, were not injured by the product in Missouri, and 
did not purchase the product in Missouri were all notable reasons, 
grounded in Bristol-Myers Squibb, for the court to deny specific personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant in the state.140 
III. DISCUSSION  
Bristol-Myers Squibb will surely pose barriers to the successful 
certification of nationwide class actions in years to come, even though its 
impact will likely not be great enough to serve as a complete death 
knell141 for nationwide class actions. Part (a) below dissects the language 
of Bristol-Myers Squibb in light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent and 
addresses what general implications such language will likely have on 
class actions going forward. Part (b) analyzes Jordan and Greene to see 
how Bristol-Myers Squibb is already reshaping present-day class action 
case law. Finally, Part (c) delves into the four types of class actions 
articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) to consider how 
Bristol-Myers Squibb will impact one type more than the others. 
a. The Language of Bristol-Myers Squibb and What it Means for Class 
Actions Going Forward 
The Court’s analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb appears flawed in light 
of personal jurisdiction precedent. The Court cites International Shoe, 
 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at *11 (emphasis added).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. (emphasis added).  
 140. Id.  
 141. “Death knell” is used in the colloquial manner in this Comment.  
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/7
2019] BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB AND NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS 843 
Hanson, and World-Wide Volkswagen in its approach to the law.142 
However, it then ignores the ideas of minimum contacts, the traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice along with the attendant World-
Wide Volkswagen factors, and purposeful availment. Instead, the Court 
emphasizes that “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims 
occurred elsewhere.”143  
As Justice Sotomayor alludes to in her dissent, this is simply not what 
specific jurisdiction precedent requires.144 Settled specific jurisdiction 
precedent from International Shoe, Hanson, World-Wide Volkswagen, 
and several other cases clearly does not require that an “‘adequate link’ 
exist ‘between the State and nonresidents’ claims,’” like the Bristol-
Myers Squibb majority contends.145 What is required from these previous 
cases is an analysis of (a) whether the party has minimum contacts with 
the forum state such that traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice are not violated,146 (b) whether the party purposefully availed itself 
of the laws and protections of the forum state,147 and (c) whether the party 
could foresee being haled into court there.148 International Shoe, Hanson, 
and World-Wide Volkswagen do not use the phrases “adequate link” or 
“adequate linkage.”149  
The Court may not have gone into a deeper analysis of reasonableness 
or of fair play and substantial justice because the Court thought the first 
prong of the Burger King two-part test had not been met. However, this 
is not immediately clear in the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion. Regardless, 
the Court incorrectly ignored basic precedent and rewrote personal 
jurisdiction law to necessitate this “adequate link.”  
Despite this potential break with precedent, lower courts are 
constrained to follow the Court’s newfound concern with “adequate link.” 
Justice Alito highlighted this issue with his phrasing throughout the 
opinion: “all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred 
elsewhere,” “nor is it sufficient . . . that [the defendant company] 
conducted research,” and “that other plaintiffs were [injured] in 
California . . . does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over 
the nonresidents’ claims.” Courts will now cite this language in finding 
 
 142. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1782. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 145. Id.  
 146. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 147. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 148. Id.; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 149. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
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that there is no jurisdiction. Because Bristol-Myers Squibb emphasizes 
“adequate link,” the case can be interpreted as adding a new element to 
personal jurisdiction tests, at least for the first prong of Burger King.  
b. The Impact Bristol-Myers Squibb is Already Having on Class Actions  
Bristol-Myers Squibb is clearly already affecting the manner in which 
lower courts treat class actions.150 Perhaps most significant is the 
heightened need for class members to now show how they each, 
individually, have a significant enough connection to the defendant(s) in 
the suit, shown through concrete, individualized evidence.  
Jordan seemingly stands for the proposition that plaintiff assertions 
need to be narrower and more specific than was required pre-Bristol-
Myers Squibb. If more courts adopt the notion of Jordan, nonresident 
plaintiffs themselves must have deeper ties related to the defendant(s) 
within the state of filing. This will notably be more and more difficult to 
achieve the larger classes are; counsel will be forced to do extensive 
analyses into each individual, nonresident, class client when attempting 
to determine if a forum is appropriate. Counsel will have to look more in-
depth at how connected each individual nonresident is to the defendant 
within the state of filing. Jordan leads to additional questions that counsel 
may now have to ask: Was something other than general marketing and 
clinical trials occurring in the state? Did each, individual plaintiff see the 
advertising that occurred by the defendant in that state? Did each, 
individual plaintiff participate in a clinical trial in that state?  
Answering these questions may be too arduous for counsel to the point 
where it becomes infeasible to take on a class action matter. Even if 
counsel decides to keep a case, the analysis about the best forum, based 
on which plaintiffs actually have sufficient ties to the defendant in a state, 
will be more expensive. Counsel will have to spend more time analyzing 
whether the court will have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in 
relation to every individual, nonresident plaintiff. Ironically, class actions 
were designed to avoid such in-depth, time-consuming discoveries.151 
One policy reason for class actions was to reduce the time spent on any 
one, particular case.152 The idea is to combine similar enough cases to 
reduce the need to research each one in great detail.153  
Even more indicative of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s effect on class actions 
is the Greene court’s outright rejection of the plaintiffs’ argument that 
 
 150. See, e.g., supra note 103. 
 151. Roger Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7.2 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
349, 352-53 (1978). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
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Bristol-Myers Squibb does not apply to class actions.154 Such a holding is 
a near death knell for class actions in the Northern District of Illinois 
because that means that class members will, like in Jordan, have to plead 
a connection to the defendant in that given forum for every single, 
individual plaintiff. Finding that Bristol-Myers Squibb applied in Greene 
and that the plaintiffs did not plead enough for jurisdiction to be found 
will make it extremely difficult for classes going forward in the Northern 
District of Illinois, for the same reasons indicated above; time and 
expenses will only increase for class action counsel, when time and 
expenses are already so high. The burden of upfront time and costs may 
become so high for plaintiff attorneys that the investment is not worth the 
possible reward. Plaintiffs may have to bring individual claims instead, 
which may not be worth doing if each possible payout is negligible.  
Moreover, the fact that the Greene court excused the defendant’s initial 
forfeiture of its claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant indicates the strength of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s effect on 
personal jurisdiction arguments going forward. Forfeiture happens when 
a party does not present an argument at the first possible time.155 Courts 
only hear forfeited issues under several exceptions, one of which is 
“changes in the law.”156 Therefore, it is reasonably deducible that the 
Greene court excused the defendant’s forfeiture of its lack of personal 
jurisdiction argument, because it thought that Bristol-Myers Squibb 
sufficiently changed the law of finding personal jurisdiction.  
As these cases indicate, Bristol-Myers Squibb poses many new barriers 
to establishing specific jurisdiction over defendants in relation to every 
single plaintiff in a nationwide class action. Authors of an amicus curie 
brief submitted to the Supreme Court during the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
litigation go so far as to claim that class actions will now only survive if 
brought in the defendant’s home state, where general jurisdiction will 
undoubtedly be found.157  
More remarkably, district court splits are just beginning to form.158 In 
DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc.,159 the Northern District of Illinois ruled that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb does apply to absent class members.160 The 
plaintiffs’ claims in that case, which were in part tied to nonresident, 
 
 154. Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 155. Melissa M. Devine, When the Courts Save Parties from Themselves: A Practitioner’s Guide 
to the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade, 21 TUL. J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 329, 331 
(Apr. 2013). 
 156. Id. at 335.  
 157. Bradt & Rave, supra note 25, at 1252.  
 158. Troyer, supra note 85.  
 159. No. 17 C 6125, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7947 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018).  
 160. Troyer, supra note 85.  
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absent plaintiffs, were dismissed.161 Alternatively, Fitzhenry-Russell v. 
Dr. Pepper Snapple Group162 did not apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to class 
actions.163 A commentator noted that in Fitzhenry-Russell, “claims of 
absent class members [were] not before the court for purposes of 
jurisdiction over the defendant,” so the claims of nonresident, absent class 
members were not dismissed.164 
The DeBernardis court predicted that “based on the Supreme Court’s 
comments about federalism[,] the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb 
to outlaw nationwide class actions in form, such as in this case, where 
there is no general jurisdiction over the Defendants.”165 Since this is only 
happening in some courts, not all—as DeBernardis predicted—the issue 
will soon be ripe for the Supreme Court, so that it can revisit the 
implications of personal jurisdiction on class actions. If the circuit courts 
affirm their lower court rulings, a circuit split will arise, requiring the 
Supreme Court to revisit what it sparked with the Bristol-Myers Squibb 
decision.166 Meanwhile, before such revisiting occurs, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb will continue to influence certain types of class actions more than 
others.  
c. The Implications of Bristol-Myers Squibb on the Different Types of 
Class Actions  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establishes four different types of 
class actions.167 The fourth type, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, is one where 
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”168 Four factors are used to analyze these predominance and 
superiority requirements of 23(b)(3) class actions: (A) the class members’ 
interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.169 Rule 
 
 161. Id.  
 162. No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).  
 163. Troyer, supra note 85.  
 164. Id.  
 165. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7947, at *6.  
 166. Troyer, supra note 85. 
 167. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); supra Discussion II(b).  
 168. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
 169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).  
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23(b)(3)(C), “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum,” implicates personal 
jurisdiction issues. The other types of class actions—23(b)(1)(A), 
23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) class actions—do not require this particular 
factor in their analyses.170 Therefore, 23(b)(3) class actions are the only 
class type likely to be affected by Bristol-Myers Squibb.  
Rule 23(b)(3)(C) has been read to embody two key points: a concern 
for aggregation and a concern for geography.171 In considering whether a 
court is geographically appropriate under a 23(b)(3)(C) predominance 
and superiority analysis, courts look at the convenience of the parties, 
whether the defendant is located in the forum state, and often whether it 
is simply possible that the forum is no worse for the class participants than 
alternative forums.172 When conducting a 23(b)(3)(C) analysis, courts 
also consider: (1) the locus of the harm, (2) the concentration of other 
events forming the basis of the action, and (3) the bulk of the proposed 
class.173 
Because these factors are largely related to jurisdictional ties to an area, 
it is likely that defendants will now highlight 23(b)(3)(C) even more in 
their fights against predominance and superiority post-Bristol-Myers 
Squibb. Defendants will argue that “the locus of harm” being primarily 
outside of a given forum will be enough to show “undesirability” of 
concentrating the claims in that forum. They will point to many plaintiffs 
being harmed outside of California as enough for the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb court to find a lack of personal jurisdiction.174 If that is not enough 
to find personal jurisdiction, defendants will then argue that there is not 
enough to find a “desirability” of “concentrating the litigation.” In all, it 
is likely that defendants fighting (b)(3) class certifications will point to 
Bristol-Myers Squibb to show that (b)(3)(C) favors their argument of not 
certifying. Bristol-Myers Squibb favors defendants, so (b)(3) classes will 
likely now be more difficult to certify when defendants raise the notions 
of that case during certification arguments.  
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are additionally more likely to be affected 
by Bristol-Myers Squibb than (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes because of the 
extensive “cohesiveness” requirement for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. 
“Cohesiveness” refers to whether the class’s claims are “common ones” 
and that “adjudication of the case will not devolve into consideration of a 
myriad of issues.”175 The Supreme Court of the United States has never 
 
 170. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(2).  
 171. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:71 (5th ed. Dec. 2017).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 411 (D.N.M. 2015).  
 174. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 175. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 171 at § 4:34. 
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formally acknowledged a “cohesiveness” requirement for (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) classes.176 However, innumerable lower courts have recognized 
“cohesiveness” as necessary in their (b)(1) and (b)(2) analyses.177 While 
(b)(3) classes also require cohesiveness,178 (b)(2) classes usually require 
more cohesiveness because unnamed members are not afforded the 
opportunity to opt out.179 
Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes require more cohesiveness, it is likely 
that (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes will have less jurisdictional problems. 
Because the classes need to be so cohesive for certification, it is probable 
that “adequate links” between the forum and the specific claim will 
exist.180 Since (b)(1) classes usually deal with limited funds181 and (b)(2) 
classes are primarily for injunctive relief,182 the defendants and 
nonresident plaintiffs will likely have enough general ties to a forum for 
courts to find jurisdiction over the nonresidents under Bristol-Myers 
Squibb.  
However, because (b)(3) nationwide classes do not require as much 
cohesiveness and because the class members have the opportunity to opt 
out, it is likely that finding jurisdiction over all (b)(3) class members may 
be more of an issue. Because less cohesiveness is required, a court may 
find that facts adequate for (b)(3) certification are not actually enough to 
find jurisdiction.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Although a case that does not directly deal with class actions, Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s personal jurisdiction implications will likely have a 
negative effect on class certification for years to come. Justice Sotomayor 
correctly emphasized that the language of the decision is concerning for 
 
 176. Id. at § 4:33. 
 177. Id. at § 4:34. Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 235 F.R.D. 191, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Rule 
23(b)(2) certification presumes that the class is cohesive.”); Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 
269 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs cannot show the cohesiveness required for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) 
class.”); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 847 (5th Cir. 2012); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. 
Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010); Shook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 
597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 23(b)(2) demands a certain cohesiveness among class members with 
respect to their injuries, the absence of which can preclude certification.”); Catron v. City of St. 
Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-923-T-23EAJ, 2010 WL 917609, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010); Blackman v. 
District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1088, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ([U]nder (b)(2), “class claims must be 
‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’ . . . cohesiveness is a significant 
touchstone of a (b)(2) class” (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997))).  
 178. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 171 at § 4:34. 
 179. Id. (citing Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3rd Cir. 1998)).  
 180. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 181. TIMOTHY E. EBLE, THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL § 23 (1999). 
 182. Id. at § 24.  
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plaintiffs going forward. The case is already having a significant enough 
effect on district court cases, to the detriment of plaintiffs, to actually alter 
case outcomes. And 23(b)(3) class actions will have even greater 
difficulty being certified because defendants will highlight the 
jurisdictional factor of 23(b)(3)(C) in the predominance and superiority 
discussion even more now. For these reasons, Bristol-Myers Squibb will 
seemingly be a partial death knell for the certification of nationwide class 
actions in subsequent years, even if it is not a complete barrier.  
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